Yeah, language is an added analytical layer on top of our thoughts. We are clearly able to have thoughts without language (feral children for example are able to process their environment, plan and predict). But language adds a formality to it. Not to challenge Chomsky on his own turf but I don’t see how this can be separated from communication, since communication is how we acquire language. Does he really posit that even a feral child will have its own internal set of mouth sounds for organizing thoughts, even when it never speaks those to anyone? Seems backwards.
What do you think evolved first - verbal communication or thoughts? Presumably we were able to think before we could speak, no? The words we have in our language are like pointers to internal concepts, and it seems to me that those internal concepts would have existed before language was a thing. The mouth-sounds as you put it are not the thoughts themselves, rather just labels for specific concepts. It might be possible and even convenient to think in mouth-sounds but it’s not necessary for logical thought.
Yeah I agree with you. There might be something to the other side of the coin though. For example, a feral human with no language will have “thoughts,” as we both agree. But they will probably be quite different than thoughts from someone with language. Having a word for something has a way of crystallizing a concept. With a lot of those at your disposal you might be capable of more sophisticated thought. It’s really hard to say since we don’t have feral people to study and we couldn’t examine their “thoughts” even if we did.
Chomsky’s concept of UG (universal grammar) is able to handle this. Since there would be a chunk of language that is innate (universal), that feral child would share it. So, as a conclusion from that, even if the feral child isn’t expressing it through vocalisation, since they lack an “application” of the UG (like Nahuatl, Mandarin, Quechua, English, Kikongo etc.), they’d still have some rather simple internal monologue.
…that said I think that Chomsky’s UG is full of shit. I do agree with him that the faculty of language might have developed first to structure thought; but my reasoning resembles a bit more yours, the role of language would be to formalise thought. Thinking without language is possible in the same way as moving across a village without roads - it’s doable but clunky, and you’ll likely take far more effort than with proper roads/ a language.
Not to challenge Chomsky on his own turf
Don’t worry. Everyone and their dog challenges him. Including himself, he’s often contradicting his own earlier statements.
Haven’t read the work, but if I can extrapolate based on assumption, this seems like something that makes sense in an innate way.
Colour would be the best example. And I think it’s an interesting one. The utility in recognising district colours is fairly obvious. Our conscious and memory need a way to label the experience of encountering different wavelengths of light, Otherwise you wouldn’t be able to recognise them again surely? You at least need a form of language internally to have the ability to recognise a pattern you’ve experienced. To me that speaks to the utility of internal dialogue/monologue.
Your own experience of a specific colour can differ wildly from another person’s. However, because the wavelength is the same, you can attach a common label to it.
The question of which originated first is interesting to me, but because of the further point, a fundamental system of attaching common labels must exist. Kids can often sort objects in categories before language skills develop.
Seems to me that we do have a universal internal language innate to all of us and we learn a common language later. It also stands to reason that the origins of external language must be based on ancestral internal language.
Perhaps those without verbal internal monologue/dialogue have a more persistent innate language, that is not overwritten by common external language?
We can recognise colours and things even without properly labelling them. (Colour example: I have no clue on how to call the colour of my cat’s fur, but I’m fairly certain to remember thus recognise it.) However, it’s hard to handle them logically this way.
if you are outside and it is raining, then you get wet
if you get wet, you might get sick
so if you are outside and it is raining, you might get sick
And at least for me this is the main role of the internal monologue. It isn’t just about repeating the state of the things, it’s about connecting pieces of info together, as if I was explaining the link to another person.
Perhaps those without verbal internal monologue/dialogue have a more persistent innate language, that is not overwritten by common external language?
Possible; I don’t know, really. It’s also possible that the “innate language” doesn’t really exist, only the innate ability to learn a language; but that ability is already enough to structure simple reasoning.
I would say we all have thoughts without language with varying levels of frequency, think about moments where you or others have said “ah i know what I want to say but forgot the word”
Yeah, language is an added analytical layer on top of our thoughts. We are clearly able to have thoughts without language (feral children for example are able to process their environment, plan and predict). But language adds a formality to it. Not to challenge Chomsky on his own turf but I don’t see how this can be separated from communication, since communication is how we acquire language. Does he really posit that even a feral child will have its own internal set of mouth sounds for organizing thoughts, even when it never speaks those to anyone? Seems backwards.
What do you think evolved first - verbal communication or thoughts? Presumably we were able to think before we could speak, no? The words we have in our language are like pointers to internal concepts, and it seems to me that those internal concepts would have existed before language was a thing. The mouth-sounds as you put it are not the thoughts themselves, rather just labels for specific concepts. It might be possible and even convenient to think in mouth-sounds but it’s not necessary for logical thought.
Yeah I agree with you. There might be something to the other side of the coin though. For example, a feral human with no language will have “thoughts,” as we both agree. But they will probably be quite different than thoughts from someone with language. Having a word for something has a way of crystallizing a concept. With a lot of those at your disposal you might be capable of more sophisticated thought. It’s really hard to say since we don’t have feral people to study and we couldn’t examine their “thoughts” even if we did.
Chomsky’s concept of UG (universal grammar) is able to handle this. Since there would be a chunk of language that is innate (universal), that feral child would share it. So, as a conclusion from that, even if the feral child isn’t expressing it through vocalisation, since they lack an “application” of the UG (like Nahuatl, Mandarin, Quechua, English, Kikongo etc.), they’d still have some rather simple internal monologue.
…that said I think that Chomsky’s UG is full of shit. I do agree with him that the faculty of language might have developed first to structure thought; but my reasoning resembles a bit more yours, the role of language would be to formalise thought. Thinking without language is possible in the same way as moving across a village without roads - it’s doable but clunky, and you’ll likely take far more effort than with proper roads/ a language.
Don’t worry. Everyone and their dog challenges him. Including himself, he’s often contradicting his own earlier statements.
Haven’t read the work, but if I can extrapolate based on assumption, this seems like something that makes sense in an innate way.
Colour would be the best example. And I think it’s an interesting one. The utility in recognising district colours is fairly obvious. Our conscious and memory need a way to label the experience of encountering different wavelengths of light, Otherwise you wouldn’t be able to recognise them again surely? You at least need a form of language internally to have the ability to recognise a pattern you’ve experienced. To me that speaks to the utility of internal dialogue/monologue.
Your own experience of a specific colour can differ wildly from another person’s. However, because the wavelength is the same, you can attach a common label to it.
The question of which originated first is interesting to me, but because of the further point, a fundamental system of attaching common labels must exist. Kids can often sort objects in categories before language skills develop.
Seems to me that we do have a universal internal language innate to all of us and we learn a common language later. It also stands to reason that the origins of external language must be based on ancestral internal language.
Perhaps those without verbal internal monologue/dialogue have a more persistent innate language, that is not overwritten by common external language?
/Ramble
[Note: this is my personal take, not Chomsky’s]
We can recognise colours and things even without properly labelling them. (Colour example: I have no clue on how to call the colour of my cat’s fur, but I’m fairly certain to remember thus recognise it.) However, it’s hard to handle them logically this way.
And at least for me this is the main role of the internal monologue. It isn’t just about repeating the state of the things, it’s about connecting pieces of info together, as if I was explaining the link to another person.
Possible; I don’t know, really. It’s also possible that the “innate language” doesn’t really exist, only the innate ability to learn a language; but that ability is already enough to structure simple reasoning.
I would say we all have thoughts without language with varying levels of frequency, think about moments where you or others have said “ah i know what I want to say but forgot the word”
Yeah I agree 100% and have used that same example in other discussions like this.