excellent, someone who knows :-)
excellent, someone who knows :-)
I think you misunderstand: the question is not about exposure to different OSes, but about the correlation/causation of a given OS to later cognitive (and other) abilities. Please do apply adequate scientific rigor here!
Das wirft natürlich eine sehr interessante wissenschaftliche Forschungsfrage auf, die ich mir erlaubt habe, in der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zu recherchieren:
“Does early exposure to different operating systems (macOS vs. Windows) correlate with differences in technological literacy and general problem-solving abilities among children and adolescents?”
The available research does not provide conclusive evidence that early exposure to different operating systems directly correlates with differences in technological literacy or problem-solving abilities among children and adolescents.
While studies reveal some interesting distinctions, the evidence is limited. Ronaldo Muyu et al., 2022 found Windows is more popular among university students (84.61% vs. 11.38% for macOS), suggesting potential usage differences. Shahid I. Ali et al., 2019 found no significant competency differences between Mac and Windows users in Excel skills. Cem Topcuoglu et al., 2024 noted that users’ perceptions of operating systems are often based on reputation rather than technical understanding.
Interestingly, Bijou Yang et al., 2003 found Mac users had significantly greater computer anxiety, which might indirectly impact technological literacy.
More targeted research is needed to definitively answer this question, particularly studies focusing on children and adolescents.


Lübeck is pretty awesome and artsy, if you manage to come early.


Mich würde interessieren, welche Reihenfolge (im Durchschnitt der Betroffenen) es gibt. Kommt der Eintrag eher am Anfang oder am Ende des Prozesses? Welcher prozentuale Anteil der Betroffenen finden den Eintrag so relevant, dass sie ihn ändern?


Thanks for the warning! I will stay clear!
Exactly. OP described a very different process.
Bullshit. I am one.
Professors don’t work like that.


ich würde “Systemversagen” sagen, weil die Gesellschaft als Ganzes das so blöde gemacht hat. der Staat ist ja “nur” Ausdruck der (blöden) Gesellschaft.


Warum scheiterte die grüne Modernisierung der Ampelregierung trotz breiter Zustimmung zu Klimaschutz in der Bevölkerung?
These: Die Gesellschaft hat einen fundamentalen Wertewandel durchlaufen:
Ursachen:
a) Geschlossene, dunkle Zukunft
b) Problematisierte individuelle Freiheit
c) System schützt Lebenswelten nicht mehr
Bezug zu Habermas (1973):
Heute:
Mechanismus: Klimaängste (90% beunruhigt) werden politisch nicht verarbeitet und deshalb umgeleitet auf:
Paradox: Trotz moderater Versprechen (weiter Autofahren, nur mit E-Motor) massive Abwehr
Ursachen:
Neue politische Dynamik:
Handlungsempfehlungen:
Empirische Untermauerung: Verweis auf soziologische Umfragen zu Klimaängsten vs. politischem Verhalten ist nachvollziehbar
Paradoxon erklärt: Liefert schlüssige Erklärung für: “Warum scheitert moderate Klimapolitik trotz Klimabewusstsein?”
Langfristperspektive: 40-jährige Entwicklung statt kurzfristige Ereigniserklärung ist methodisch solide
Mechanismus der Projektion: Psychologisch plausibel, dass unbewältigte Ängste auf andere Felder verschoben werden
Habermas-Aktualisierung: Intelligente Anwendung klassischer Theorie auf neue Situation
Überverallgemeinerung?
Monokausalität Klimafrage
Projektionsthese schwer belegbar
Normative Implikationen unklar
Widerspruch im Handlungsvorschlag
Heizungsgesetz-Beispiel
USA-Deutschland-Vergleich
Wie erklärt die These Länder mit erfolgreicher Klimapolitik (Dänemark, Schweden)?
Was ist mit jüngeren Generationen, die progressiver eingestellt scheinen?
Kann “schnelles Handeln bei Kipppunkten” demokratisch legitimiert werden?
Unterschätzt die Analyse materielle Interessen (fossile Industrien, Automobillobby)?
Stärken: Staabs Analyse bietet eine originelle, theoretisch fundierte Erklärung für ein reales Paradoxon. Die Verbindung von Habermas’ Krisentheorie mit aktuellen Phänomenen ist intellektuell anregend.
Schwächen: Die These neigt zu Überverallgemeinerung und erklärt möglicherweise zu viel mit einem Faktor. Die normativen Handlungsempfehlungen bleiben vage und werfen demokratietheoretische Fragen auf.
Gesamteinschätzung: Plausible Teildiagnose, aber vermutlich nicht die ganze Erklärung. Hilfreich für das Verständnis psychosozialer Dynamiken, sollte aber durch materielle und institutionelle Analysen ergänzt werden.
===========
Abschrift des Interviews mit Whisper, dann weiterverarbeitet mit LLM.


Von denen, die hier kommentiert haben, hat glaube ich keiner das angehört.


I would recommend looking at Peter turchin instead. He is in YouTube, and works scientifically.


… so he is full of bullshit.


Is Jiang Xueqin a Scientist? What Are His Credentials?
Academic Background: Jiang has a Bachelor’s degree in English Literature from Yale College (graduated 1999). He is a researcher at the Global Education Innovation Initiative at Harvard Graduate School of Education and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts Jiang Xueqin - Big Think +2
.
He is NOT:
A trained historian with a PhD in history
A political scientist with formal academic credentials in international relations
A scientist in the conventional sense (no training in data science, statistics, or quantitative methods)
He IS:
An education reformer and administrator who has worked at elite Chinese schools
A public intellectual and writer who contributes to media outlets
Someone who explicitly identifies as "a conspiracy theorist" in his own words
Lessons from Jiang Xueqin
His Objective and Approach Self-Admitted Conspiracy Thinking:
Jiang himself states: “I’m a conspiracy theorist…but you can make the argument that some of this was intentional to implode the Chinese economy” Lessons from Jiang Xueqin
. This is significant—he’s not hiding this aspect of his thinking. His Background Story:
After Yale, Jiang struggled professionally, rarely lasting more than six months in journalism jobs. He was rejected by major publications like The New Yorker and “spent his days at home, drinking and playing video games late into the night.” He had difficulty getting along with colleagues and editors Bitter Lessons From a Chinese Education Reformer His education reform experiment at Shenzhen Middle School (2008-2009) lasted less than two years and ended badly. He admits: “I didn’t respect those kids, nor did I communicate myself as best as I could. That’s what I regret the most.” His approach was described as “aggressive, forthright, and at times arrogant.” ChinaFile Sixth Tone What He Offers:
Jiang describes his methodology as applying pattern recognition learned from Yale’s English department and Harvard’s education research to history. His academic training was “to read patterns in complex texts”—now applied to geopolitical events Jiang Xueqin’s Prophecies of Global Collapse and Civil War 📉 Critical Assessment Major Concerns:
No Formal Historical Training: Unlike Turchin (who at least has extensive published research and peer-reviewed work), Jiang has no academic credentials in history, political science, or any quantitative field.
Self-Professed Conspiracy Theorist: He openly embraces this label, which should raise red flags about confirmation bias and motivated reasoning.
No Peer Review: His "Predictive History" is essentially a YouTube channel, not published research subject to academic scrutiny.
Lack of Counterarguments: As you noted, he presents theories without engaging opposing views or acknowledging uncertainty in the way a trained scholar would.
Pattern Matching Without Rigor: His method of finding historical analogies (Athens-Sicily = U.S.-Iran) is a common form of historical reasoning, but without systematic methodology, it can be highly misleading. History is full of false analogies.
Unfalsifiable Claims: His statement, "If my prediction is wrong, I re-work my model," is the opposite of scientific thinking—it means the framework can never be proven wrong.
Jiang Xueqin’s Prophecies of Global Collapse and Civil War 📉
What He’s Actually Doing:
Jiang appears to be:
An educated storyteller using historical narratives to create compelling geopolitical scenarios
A public intellectual who found an audience after years of professional frustration
A contrarian thinker who positions himself against mainstream narratives (which can be valuable but also risky)
Someone engaged in speculative futurism rather than rigorous predictive modeling
The YouTube Video Concern
Without being able to access the specific video you linked, based on the pattern of his work:
Yes, he does present conspiracy-oriented theories without robust counterarguments:
Claims about the "Jewish lobby" pushing for war
Theories about intentional economic implosion
Grand narratives about elite manipulation and civilizational collapse
Self-fulfilling prophecies involving religious end-times believers
His appeal comes from:
Getting some predictions partially correct (Trump's return, Iran tensions)
Speaking to genuine anxieties about inequality, conflict, and decline
Offering clear, dramatic narratives in uncertain times
His bicultural perspective and contrarian stance
The danger is:
Confirmation bias (people remember hits, forget misses)
Lack of epistemic humility
Potential to spread unfounded conspiracy theories
Simplifying complex geopolitics into good-guys-vs-bad-guys narratives
Bottom Line
Jiang is not a scientist or trained historian. He’s an autodidact public intellectual with a humanities background who has found an audience for his speculative geopolitical storytelling. His work should be consumed as:
Thought-provoking perspective from someone with an enjoyable life experience
One possible interpretation of current events, not an authoritative analysis
Speculative scenario-building rather than rigorous forecasting
Compare this to Turchin, who, despite his critics:
Has a PhD in a quantitative field (biology)
Publishes peer-reviewed research
Uses databases and statistical methods
Has his work been critiqued and refined by other scholars
Makes falsifiable predictions
Your instinct to be skeptical is correct. Jiang’s work can be interesting to think about, but should not be treated as authoritative. He’s more akin to a public commentator or futurist than a researcher. The fact that he presents theories “without counterarguments” is a major methodological red flag—good scholarship always engages with alternative explanations and acknowledges uncertainty.


Short comparison:
Background: Jiang Xueqin is a Beijing-based historian and educator with a Yale degree in English Literature and research positions at Harvard’s Graduate School of Education. He has served as Deputy Principal at prestigious Chinese schools, including Tsinghua University High School and Peking University High School.
Core Methodology: Jiang’s “predictive history” approach is explicitly borrowed from Isaac Asimov’s fictional concept of “psychohistory”—a science that uses history, sociology, and mathematics to predict the behavior of large populations. His framework combines:
Key Ideas:
Notable Predictions: Jiang gained viral attention for his May 2024 lecture predicting Trump’s return to the presidency and a U.S.-Iran war driven by Israel lobby pressure, Saudi interests, and America’s reliance on global hegemony.
Background: Peter Turchin is a theoretical biologist with no formal history degrees who founded cliodynamics, a transdisciplinary field integrating cultural evolution, economic history, macrosociology, and mathematical modeling.
Core Methodology: Cliodynamics treats history as science—practitioners develop theories that explain dynamical processes like the rise and fall of empires, then translate these theories into mathematical models and test predictions against data. Key elements include:
Key Concepts:
Notable Predictions: Turchin predicted in 2010 that U.S. political instability would peak in the 2020s based on 50-year cycle patterns (spikes around 1870, 1920, 1970).
Similarities:
Major Differences:
| Aspect | Jiang’s Predictive History | Turchin’s Cliodynamics |
|---|---|---|
| Academic Training | Humanities (English Literature) | Natural Sciences (Biology) |
| Primary Method | Historical analogy + game theory | Mathematical modeling + statistical analysis |
| Data Approach | Qualitative pattern recognition | Quantitative databases and metrics |
| Emphasis | Spiritual/cultural factors, elite psychology | Economic inequality, demographic cycles |
| Specificity | Makes specific near-term predictions (dates, actors) | Identifies broad cyclical trends and timeframes |
| Rigor | Critics note assumptions and historical examples that may be out of context | Critics argue mathematical models can be opaque and produce banalities |
| Cultural Lens | Bicultural (China-US), emphasizes civilizational soul | Western academic, emphasizes structural-demographic forces |
Philosophical Differences:
Flexibility: Jiang acknowledges, “If my prediction is wrong, I re-work my model,” suggesting an iterative, less dogmatic approach, whereas cliodynamics claims to be testing falsifiable hypotheses with the scientific method.
Both approaches face skepticism from traditional historians who argue that complex social formations cannot and should not be reduced to quantifiable points, as this overlooks each society’s particular circumstances. However, they represent essential attempts to find patterns in history that might help us navigate contemporary crises.


Does it mention cliodynamics?
und, wo kann ich das kaufen? ich brauche L
das ist nicht die Schuld von Politik und Industrie. Das sind die doofen Bürger. Die Industrie würde. aber solange die Bürger nicht wollen, macht die Politik nichts. das ist Demokratieversagen von der Basis her. https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/gescheiterte-klimawende-aufstand-der-anstaendigen-100.html