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  • bremen15@feddit.orgtoLemmy Shitpost@lemmy.worldA hypothesis
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    14 days ago

    Das wirft natürlich eine sehr interessante wissenschaftliche Forschungsfrage auf, die ich mir erlaubt habe, in der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zu recherchieren:

    “Does early exposure to different operating systems (macOS vs. Windows) correlate with differences in technological literacy and general problem-solving abilities among children and adolescents?”

    The available research does not provide conclusive evidence that early exposure to different operating systems directly correlates with differences in technological literacy or problem-solving abilities among children and adolescents.

    While studies reveal some interesting distinctions, the evidence is limited. Ronaldo Muyu et al., 2022 found Windows is more popular among university students (84.61% vs. 11.38% for macOS), suggesting potential usage differences. Shahid I. Ali et al., 2019 found no significant competency differences between Mac and Windows users in Excel skills. Cem Topcuoglu et al., 2024 noted that users’ perceptions of operating systems are often based on reputation rather than technical understanding.

    Interestingly, Bijou Yang et al., 2003 found Mac users had significantly greater computer anxiety, which might indirectly impact technological literacy.

    More targeted research is needed to definitively answer this question, particularly studies focusing on children and adolescents.












  • Kernthema

    Warum scheiterte die grüne Modernisierung der Ampelregierung trotz breiter Zustimmung zu Klimaschutz in der Bevölkerung?


    Hauptthesen von Philipp Staab

    1. Zentrale Diagnose: Von Selbstentfaltung zu Selbsterhaltung

    These: Die Gesellschaft hat einen fundamentalen Wertewandel durchlaufen:

    • Früher (70er-90er): Orientierung an Fortschritt, Selbstentfaltung, offener Zukunft
    • Heute: Orientierung an Gegenwartsverlängerung, Verlustabwehr, Selbsterhaltung

    Ursachen:

    • 40 Jahre wachsendes ökologisches Bewusstsein
    • Zunehmende soziale Ungleichheit
    • Staat zieht sich zurück, verlagert Systemprobleme auf Individuen
    • Menschen müssen mehr Reproduktionsprobleme selbst lösen

    2. Drei erodierte Grundlagen liberaler Politik

    a) Geschlossene, dunkle Zukunft

    • Früher: Offene, helle Zukunft als Fortschrittsversprechen
    • Heute: Zukunft durch Klimakrise bedrohlich; durch CO2-Budgets “geschlossen”

    b) Problematisierte individuelle Freiheit

    • Früher: Individuelle Freiheit als Leitstern
    • Heute: Konsumfreiheit wird als Ursache für Klimawandel und Ungleichheit gesehen

    c) System schützt Lebenswelten nicht mehr

    • Früher: Staat hält Systemprobleme von privaten Lebenswelten fern
    • Heute: System wirft Probleme “vor die Füße” der Bürger (Selbstvorsorge, Konsumanpassung)

    3. Legitimationskrise: Habermas reloaded

    Bezug zu Habermas (1973):

    • Damals: Ökonomische Krisen eingehegt, kulturelle Kritik erwartet
    • Realität: Kulturelle Kritik wurde absorbiert, ökonomische Krisen kehrten zurück

    Heute:

    • System und Lebenswelt fahren nicht mehr im “Tandem” in dieselbe Richtung
    • Lebenswelt: defensiv, auf Bewahrung orientiert
    • System: muss modernisieren, kann nicht anders

    4. Projektion von Ängsten

    Mechanismus: Klimaängste (90% beunruhigt) werden politisch nicht verarbeitet und deshalb umgeleitet auf:

    • Migration (“Grenzkontrollen schaffen wir noch”)
    • Identitätspolitik (plötzlich “existenzielle” Bedrohung)
    • Kulturkampfthemen (Schnitzelverbot, Veggie-Day)

    5. Scheitern grüner Modernisierung

    Paradox: Trotz moderater Versprechen (weiter Autofahren, nur mit E-Motor) massive Abwehr

    Ursachen:

    • Mangelndes Systemvertrauen
    • “Traumatisierung” durch frühere Modernisierungen (“was gestern richtig war, ist heute falsch”)
    • Berührung normativer Lebensvorstellungen
    • Glaubwürdigkeitsproblem: Grünes Wachstum wirkt “zu schön, um wahr zu sein”

    6. Politische Konsequenzen

    Neue politische Dynamik:

    • Langfristige Modernisierungsprojekte (“Kathedralen”) funktionieren nicht mehr
    • Stattdessen: Taktik und Okkasionalismus (Gelegenheitsorientierung)
    • Rechte beherrscht dieses Spiel besser
    • Schnelle Volatilität, politische Kipppunkte

    Handlungsempfehlungen:

    • Politische Kipppunkte nutzen (Ahrtal, Pandemie als verpasste Chancen)
    • Bei Machtgewinn schnell handeln
    • Infrastrukturen setzen statt individuelle Verhaltensänderungen erwarten

    Plausibilitätscheck

    ✅ Starke Argumente

    1. Empirische Untermauerung: Verweis auf soziologische Umfragen zu Klimaängsten vs. politischem Verhalten ist nachvollziehbar

    2. Paradoxon erklärt: Liefert schlüssige Erklärung für: “Warum scheitert moderate Klimapolitik trotz Klimabewusstsein?”

    3. Langfristperspektive: 40-jährige Entwicklung statt kurzfristige Ereigniserklärung ist methodisch solide

    4. Mechanismus der Projektion: Psychologisch plausibel, dass unbewältigte Ängste auf andere Felder verschoben werden

    5. Habermas-Aktualisierung: Intelligente Anwendung klassischer Theorie auf neue Situation

    ⚠️ Kritische Punkte

    1. Überverallgemeinerung?

      • Sind wirklich ALLE Gesellschaftsbereiche so defensiv?
      • Gibt es nicht auch progressive, zukunftsorientierte Milieus?
    2. Monokausalität Klimafrage

      • Werden andere Faktoren (Digitalisierung, Globalisierung, Pandemie) ausreichend gewichtet?
      • Ist die Klimafrage wirklich die “über allem thronende” Ursache?
    3. Projektionsthese schwer belegbar

      • Wie weist man empirisch nach, dass Migrationsängste “eigentlich” Klimaängste sind?
      • Könnte zirkulär sein: Alles wird auf Klimafrage zurückgeführt
    4. Normative Implikationen unklar

      • “Politischer Okkasionalismus” klingt wie Opportunismus
      • Wie unterscheidet sich das von autoritärer “Durchsetzungspolitik”?
      • Demokratietheoretisch problematisch?
    5. Widerspruch im Handlungsvorschlag

      • Diagnose: Menschen wollen keine Modernisierung
      • Therapie: Schnell modernisieren bei Gelegenheiten
      • Löst das nicht das Legitimationsproblem, das diagnostiziert wurde?
    6. Heizungsgesetz-Beispiel

      • War der Widerstand wirklich “irrational”?
      • Oder gab es berechtigte Sorgen (Kosten, Technologieoffenheit, Timing)?
    7. USA-Deutschland-Vergleich

      • Sind die Gesellschaften vergleichbar genug?
      • USA hatte Biden-Erfolge bei grüner Industriepolitik (IRA)

    ❓ Offene Fragen

    1. Wie erklärt die These Länder mit erfolgreicher Klimapolitik (Dänemark, Schweden)?

    2. Was ist mit jüngeren Generationen, die progressiver eingestellt scheinen?

    3. Kann “schnelles Handeln bei Kipppunkten” demokratisch legitimiert werden?

    4. Unterschätzt die Analyse materielle Interessen (fossile Industrien, Automobillobby)?


    Fazit

    Stärken: Staabs Analyse bietet eine originelle, theoretisch fundierte Erklärung für ein reales Paradoxon. Die Verbindung von Habermas’ Krisentheorie mit aktuellen Phänomenen ist intellektuell anregend.

    Schwächen: Die These neigt zu Überverallgemeinerung und erklärt möglicherweise zu viel mit einem Faktor. Die normativen Handlungsempfehlungen bleiben vage und werfen demokratietheoretische Fragen auf.

    Gesamteinschätzung: Plausible Teildiagnose, aber vermutlich nicht die ganze Erklärung. Hilfreich für das Verständnis psychosozialer Dynamiken, sollte aber durch materielle und institutionelle Analysen ergänzt werden.

    ===========

    Abschrift des Interviews mit Whisper, dann weiterverarbeitet mit LLM.





  • Is Jiang Xueqin a Scientist? What Are His Credentials?

    Academic Background: Jiang has a Bachelor’s degree in English Literature from Yale College (graduated 1999). He is a researcher at the Global Education Innovation Initiative at Harvard Graduate School of Education and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts Jiang Xueqin - Big Think +2

    .

    He is NOT:

    A trained historian with a PhD in history
    A political scientist with formal academic credentials in international relations
    A scientist in the conventional sense (no training in data science, statistics, or quantitative methods)
    

    He IS:

    An education reformer and administrator who has worked at elite Chinese schools
    A public intellectual and writer who contributes to media outlets
    Someone who explicitly identifies as "a conspiracy theorist" in his own words
    Lessons from Jiang Xueqin
    

    His Objective and Approach Self-Admitted Conspiracy Thinking:

    Jiang himself states: “I’m a conspiracy theorist…but you can make the argument that some of this was intentional to implode the Chinese economy” Lessons from Jiang Xueqin

    . This is significant—he’s not hiding this aspect of his thinking. His Background Story:

    After Yale, Jiang struggled professionally, rarely lasting more than six months in journalism jobs. He was rejected by major publications like The New Yorker and “spent his days at home, drinking and playing video games late into the night.” He had difficulty getting along with colleagues and editors Bitter Lessons From a Chinese Education Reformer His education reform experiment at Shenzhen Middle School (2008-2009) lasted less than two years and ended badly. He admits: “I didn’t respect those kids, nor did I communicate myself as best as I could. That’s what I regret the most.” His approach was described as “aggressive, forthright, and at times arrogant.” ChinaFile Sixth Tone What He Offers:

    Jiang describes his methodology as applying pattern recognition learned from Yale’s English department and Harvard’s education research to history. His academic training was “to read patterns in complex texts”—now applied to geopolitical events Jiang Xueqin’s Prophecies of Global Collapse and Civil War 📉 Critical Assessment Major Concerns:

    No Formal Historical Training: Unlike Turchin (who at least has extensive published research and peer-reviewed work), Jiang has no academic credentials in history, political science, or any quantitative field.
    Self-Professed Conspiracy Theorist: He openly embraces this label, which should raise red flags about confirmation bias and motivated reasoning.
    No Peer Review: His "Predictive History" is essentially a YouTube channel, not published research subject to academic scrutiny.
    Lack of Counterarguments: As you noted, he presents theories without engaging opposing views or acknowledging uncertainty in the way a trained scholar would.
    Pattern Matching Without Rigor: His method of finding historical analogies (Athens-Sicily = U.S.-Iran) is a common form of historical reasoning, but without systematic methodology, it can be highly misleading. History is full of false analogies.
    Unfalsifiable Claims: His statement, "If my prediction is wrong, I re-work my model," is the opposite of scientific thinking—it means the framework can never be proven wrong.
    Jiang Xueqin’s Prophecies of Global Collapse and Civil War 📉
    

    What He’s Actually Doing:

    Jiang appears to be:

    An educated storyteller using historical narratives to create compelling geopolitical scenarios
    A public intellectual who found an audience after years of professional frustration
    A contrarian thinker who positions himself against mainstream narratives (which can be valuable but also risky)
    Someone engaged in speculative futurism rather than rigorous predictive modeling
    

    The YouTube Video Concern

    Without being able to access the specific video you linked, based on the pattern of his work:

    Yes, he does present conspiracy-oriented theories without robust counterarguments:

    Claims about the "Jewish lobby" pushing for war
    Theories about intentional economic implosion
    Grand narratives about elite manipulation and civilizational collapse
    Self-fulfilling prophecies involving religious end-times believers
    

    His appeal comes from:

    Getting some predictions partially correct (Trump's return, Iran tensions)
    Speaking to genuine anxieties about inequality, conflict, and decline
    Offering clear, dramatic narratives in uncertain times
    His bicultural perspective and contrarian stance
    

    The danger is:

    Confirmation bias (people remember hits, forget misses)
    Lack of epistemic humility
    Potential to spread unfounded conspiracy theories
    Simplifying complex geopolitics into good-guys-vs-bad-guys narratives
    

    Bottom Line

    Jiang is not a scientist or trained historian. He’s an autodidact public intellectual with a humanities background who has found an audience for his speculative geopolitical storytelling. His work should be consumed as:

    Thought-provoking perspective from someone with an enjoyable life experience
    One possible interpretation of current events, not an authoritative analysis
    Speculative scenario-building rather than rigorous forecasting
    

    Compare this to Turchin, who, despite his critics:

    Has a PhD in a quantitative field (biology)
    Publishes peer-reviewed research
    Uses databases and statistical methods
    Has his work been critiqued and refined by other scholars
    Makes falsifiable predictions
    

    Your instinct to be skeptical is correct. Jiang’s work can be interesting to think about, but should not be treated as authoritative. He’s more akin to a public commentator or futurist than a researcher. The fact that he presents theories “without counterarguments” is a major methodological red flag—good scholarship always engages with alternative explanations and acknowledges uncertainty.


  • Short comparison:

    Professor Jiang Xueqin’s Predictive History

    Background: Jiang Xueqin is a Beijing-based historian and educator with a Yale degree in English Literature and research positions at Harvard’s Graduate School of Education. He has served as Deputy Principal at prestigious Chinese schools, including Tsinghua University High School and Peking University High School.

    Core Methodology: Jiang’s “predictive history” approach is explicitly borrowed from Isaac Asimov’s fictional concept of “psychohistory”—a science that uses history, sociology, and mathematics to predict the behavior of large populations. His framework combines:

    1. Historical Pattern Recognition: He uses historical precedents like the Sicilian Expedition by ancient Athens, the Vietnam War, and ongoing conflicts to identify recurring patterns
    2. Game Theory: Jiang analyzes key players’ incentives and concludes how different actors might provoke conflict based on their divergent endgames
    3. Historical Analogy: Rather than pure quantitative modeling, he draws parallels between past empires and current geopolitical situations

    Key Ideas:

    • Jiang predicts a coming era of spiritual exhaustion and religious revival, arguing that “the appeal of money and materialism is dying” and people are “exhausted, disillusioned, and frustrated”
    • He sees civilizational collapse as linked to spiritual vacuum and elite failure, not just economic factors
    • His analysis emphasizes how major powers overestimate their capabilities, underestimate local resistance, and misjudge strategic costs

    Notable Predictions: Jiang gained viral attention for his May 2024 lecture predicting Trump’s return to the presidency and a U.S.-Iran war driven by Israel lobby pressure, Saudi interests, and America’s reliance on global hegemony.


    Cliodynamics (Peter Turchin)

    Background: Peter Turchin is a theoretical biologist with no formal history degrees who founded cliodynamics, a transdisciplinary field integrating cultural evolution, economic history, macrosociology, and mathematical modeling.

    Core Methodology: Cliodynamics treats history as science—practitioners develop theories that explain dynamical processes like the rise and fall of empires, then translate these theories into mathematical models and test predictions against data. Key elements include:

    1. Mathematical Modeling: Turchin employs equations like the predator-prey (Lotka-Volterra) model to analyze the dynamics of medieval agrarian states as oscillatory systems
    2. Big Data: Building massive databases like the Seshat Global History Databank to systematically collect data on political and social organization across human societies
    3. Structural-Demographic Theory: Focuses on measurable variables including real wage stagnation, elite overproduction (growing demand for educational credentials, exploding MBAs and JDs), and state fiscal health

    Key Concepts:

    • Elite overproduction is identified as the most critical driver of social instability, alongside popular immiseration and declining state fiscal health
    • Turchin’s theory of secular cycles explains how population and warfare variables oscillate with the same period but shifted in phase
    • Emphasizes that theories must be translated into mathematical models with precise predictions tested on empirical material

    Notable Predictions: Turchin predicted in 2010 that U.S. political instability would peak in the 2020s based on 50-year cycle patterns (spikes around 1870, 1920, 1970).


    Key Comparisons

    Similarities:

    • Both seek to make history predictive and scientific
    • Both reference Asimov’s psychohistory concept as inspiration
    • Both identify patterns and cycles in historical processes
    • Both focus on predicting major social/political instability

    Major Differences:

    Aspect Jiang’s Predictive History Turchin’s Cliodynamics
    Academic Training Humanities (English Literature) Natural Sciences (Biology)
    Primary Method Historical analogy + game theory Mathematical modeling + statistical analysis
    Data Approach Qualitative pattern recognition Quantitative databases and metrics
    Emphasis Spiritual/cultural factors, elite psychology Economic inequality, demographic cycles
    Specificity Makes specific near-term predictions (dates, actors) Identifies broad cyclical trends and timeframes
    Rigor Critics note assumptions and historical examples that may be out of context Critics argue mathematical models can be opaque and produce banalities
    Cultural Lens Bicultural (China-US), emphasizes civilizational soul Western academic, emphasizes structural-demographic forces

    Philosophical Differences:

    • Jiang emphasizes that “powerful people are influenced by beliefs and warp reality to fit their beliefs—it’s a self-fulfilling prophecy”, suggesting agency and ideology matter greatly
    • Turchin insists that “in science, data triumph over theories” and seeks laws independent of individual agency

    Flexibility: Jiang acknowledges, “If my prediction is wrong, I re-work my model,” suggesting an iterative, less dogmatic approach, whereas cliodynamics claims to be testing falsifiable hypotheses with the scientific method.

    Both approaches face skepticism from traditional historians who argue that complex social formations cannot and should not be reduced to quantifiable points, as this overlooks each society’s particular circumstances. However, they represent essential attempts to find patterns in history that might help us navigate contemporary crises.