image transcript (via tesseract-ocr)
SECRETARY OF WAR
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000
DEC - 9 2025
MEMORANDUM FOR ALL DEPARTMENT OF WAR PERSONNEL
SUBJECT: Harness Artificial Intelligence Now with GenAl
I am pleased to introduce GenAl.mil, a secure generative artificial intelligence (Al) platform for every member of the Department of War. It is live today and available on the desktops of all military personnel, civilians, and contractors. With this launch we are taking a giant step toward mass Al adoption across the Department. This tool marks the beginning of a new era where every member of our workforce can be more efficient and impactful.
The first GenAl platform capability is Google Gemini, a frontier Al application that can help you write documents, ask questions, conduct deep research, format content, and unlock new possibilities across your daily workflows. Gemini is the first of several enterprise Al applications that will be rolled out on the GenAI platform. It is secure, certified up to Impact Level 5 (ILS), and is fully authorized to handle CUI.
Victory belongs to those who embrace real innovation. Rather than being reliant on the dusty, antiquated systems of a bygone era, we are thinking ahead here in the Department of War. GenAl.mil is part of this monumental transformation. It removes wasted time and focuses more of our energy into decisive results for the warfighter.
Access is straightforward. Navigate to GenAl.mil and you will be able to access the tool with your CAC. The platform is certified secure for operational use on NIPR.
I expect every member of the Department to log in, learn it, and incorporate it into your workflows immediately. Al should be in your battle rhythm every single day.
It should be your teammate. By mastering this tool, we will outpace our adversaries. The power is now in your hands.
memo via https://xcancel.com/kenklippenstein/status/1998829304856068344
It can be, but that’s not the context in which it is being used here. The actual warfighting significance of the “battle rhythm” is derived from the older OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) Loop concept which was how a conflict was to be prosecuted until you were victorious. The idea being that if you could get through your OODA loop faster and more correctly than the opposing side you would outmaneuver and outfight them.
You would thus have a warfighting battle rhythm which set up the inputs that would feed into a however you were processing the information leading to a decision point that would result in an executable plan to be carried out. You would then observe the follow on impacts of that execution and then the process starts all over again.
The crux of the idea is that, due to the abundance of practical cases and information gleaned from various exercises, you know exactly how fast you can gather the info, process it, decide and execute and this you can set up a timeline for your entire operation.
Never turns out that way in practice though due to what our friend Mr. Clausewitz referred to as “friction”. It can also lead to indecision as you get stuck on the “observe” and “decide” parts and then folks start chucking the responsibility for that decision upwards as they seek a perfect solution. Which is why I tend to advise “an okay plan applied immediately and vigorously is far better than a perfect plan ten minutes too late”.
Or, as it was known in non-military circles back in the day: “Look before you leap”.
Or dead.
Suuuuure…
Which obviously depends on what you’re planning. If you’re planning D-Day, another 10 minutes to get a perfect plan is worth the wait. If you’re planning how you’re going to attack a machine gun nest that’s currently shooting at you, 10 minutes of being shot at might be too long.
I get that you need to find a balance between completely winging it when planning or fighting a war, vs being caught in analysis paralysis. And, that the more experienced you are, the more you can figure out the optimal balance between the two, and that allows you to be more predictable, which allows higher-ups to have more consistent plans. IMO, this just makes the idea of using AI in your “battle rhythm” even more stupid. Take something where decades of institutional experience allows you to predict a certain “rhythm”, now throw AI into the mix and its ability to quickly spit out a plausible looking output that’s answer-shaped and you either have to explicitly trust the magic 8-ball’s output, or you have to spend an unpredictable amount of time going over the output to see if it is flawed. Either way, you disrupt this rhythm that’s apparently so important.
Actually yes. A not insignificant part of battle planning is to try and disrupt the opposing side’s OODA loop. The whole idea was to make it so you could react faster and more appropriately.
Lots of the tools and information processing systems used in the modern battlefield are designed to quickly take raw data and present that into a format which the decision maker can use to actually make the correct decision.
Which is why I am leery of using AI in this fashion. Oh sure, if you want to use it to create a briefing note on the forecasted widget usages, meeting minutes about the feasibility of a Christmas party at Montana’s or so on, that’s fine but to actually parse and data that will result in application of lethal force is a whole different kettle of fish.
Now yes, there are currently systems that are Auto Engage, but they are very much not AI and the only thing they are generally used for is anti air defense where you have a very limited window in which to successfully prosecute a threat.
That concept has existed long before anyone had ever heard of an “OODA loop”. Sun Tzu wrote about “disrupting the opposing side’s OODA loop” centuries ago, using different terms.
Even in WWI it was smoke to prevent them from seeing (observing) clearly. Artillery to disrupt things so they can’t make good plans (which was labelled as “orient” for some strange reason). Barbed wire to prevent them from moving, thereby disrupting the “act” phase. Fundamentally since OODA is such a non-obvious acronym for such an obvious and all-encompassing subject, you can frame everything in terms of “disrupting an OODA loop”, but that doesn’t mean talking about OODA loops is insightful in any way.
Also, fundamentally that’s all secondary to having more troops, greater firepower, more range, etc. If one side has a phalanx and the other side has an attack helicopter, the battle isn’t going to come down to whoever has the least disrupted OODA loops.
Ah, wonderful that you’re familiar with Sun Tzu! Indeed he did write about this, in particular how the acme of generalship was to “balk the enemy’s plans”. The whole concept has just been refined and reframed using twentieth and twenty-first century terms and context. However, his basic premise remains as true as it was back then.
Now, most state on state conflict these days isn’t phalanx on attack helicopter as both sides have broadly equivalent firepower and capabilities. As such it really does come down to doctrinal differences. For instance, in the First Gulf War, Iraqi C2 was crippled via precision attacks which severely hampered their ability to respond to Coalition ground attack. Yes, the Abrams and the Challenger tanks heavily outclassed the Iraqi armour, however, it was due to the Coalition having overwhelming situational awareness and being able to exploit the weaknesses that developed after the initial strikes.
I must say, I am truly enjoying this discussion! You bring up some really good points!
Not for the US. The US hasn’t had to face a near peer enemy since WWII. When was the last time the US didn’t have air supremacy in a conflict? They had it even in Korea and Vietnam and since then the advantage has only grown. Plus now it’s not just air, it’s satellites and drones. That allows the US to use GPS-guided weapons, or use GPS to move forces, with satellites and drones to verify that the path is clear. Also, US air supremacy means the US can strike any enemy target in any position from the air, knocking out enemy communications, radar, power, ammo dumps, etc.
Yes – attack helicopters vs. phalanxes. How was the US able to perform these precision attacks? Its overwhelming advantage in firepower, tech, etc. meant that it quickly established air supremacy and was able to strike Iraqi targets at will. It’s not that Iraq didn’t think of crippling the US forces in the same way, it’s that it was completely unable to do that because of the US superiority in numbers, tech and firepower.
Which was the result of a massive difference in tech, plus complete air supremacy allowing them to completely disrupt any Iraqi communication. The US could have been using WWII Sherman tanks and still would have won because they had control of the skies and were able to use that to isolate Iraqi units. And, that’s not to mention that the US tanks had night vision systems while the Iraqis didn’t, so a lot of engagements were designed to happen at night when the Iraqis were blind and the US forces could see clearly.
The US victory in the first Iraq war had nothing to do with the US being clever and disrupting Iraq’s “OODA loops” and everything to do with the US having a massive advantage in tech, firepower, etc.
If you wanted to look at a conflict where the side with the better doctrine is having a better result, you could look at Ukraine vs. Russia. Russia has a huge manpower advantage, and started the war with a huge advantage in equipment. But, Russia is famous for having rigid command structures and top-heavy decision making. Ukraine isn’t winning the war, but just not losing is a major achievement given all the advantages Russia has. And, at least some of that comes down to Ukraine having much better visibility into what Russia is doing (thanks in part to US and European tech) allowing them to make better decisions, so that when they act they have a better chance of success. Russia’s ability to see what Ukraine is doing is weaker because they lack the latest NATO tech, and they make worse decisions and make those decisions slower because of the structure of their military. So, Ukraine’s information and control structure advantages are helping offset the disadvantage they face because they’re so much smaller than Russia.
I would argue that one of the major advantages that our friends in Ukraine have is that they are using both playbooks. Consider, for the great majority of the twentieth century, the Ukrainian Forces were a vitally integral part of the USSR and thus learned to fight in the Soviet style. However, upon the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainians began to develop closer ties with NATO and NATO aligned countries, thus learning some of our battle strategy, which was, for the most part, designed to counter the USSR and their way of warfare. So essentially, they know what the Russians will likely try and also they know what steps should be taken to counter those actions.
I suspect we have strayed somewhat from the original topic under discussion, but that’s fine with me!
My guess is that since Russia invaded Ukraine there have been a lot of Americans and other NATO people spending time in Ukraine, teaching and training. Most of it is probably done in a quiet, plausibly deniable way. Like, former soldiers hired through a private foundation that has a secret donor list. It would be very cheap for NATO countries to do, and it could be very effective. Even if countries can’t get their public to agree to ship weapons to Ukraine, European leaders almost certainly know that Russia is a major threat, and as soon as it defeats Ukraine that threat will be aimed at them. A small investment now to keep Ukraine fighting means less needs to be spent later if Russia wins.
Anyhow, my point is that that’s one of the few modern conflicts where there are near-peer forces fighting each-other. In the earliest days of the invasion Russia’s advantage over Ukraine might have been as big as the US advantage over Iraq. But, since then with training, arms, ammunition and tech from NATO countries, Ukraine is probably on par with Russia in some ways, and ahead of them in others, though still way behind in total manpower. Because of that, I think it’s one of the few conflicts where the conflict won’t simply be decided by the side with the newest tech or the side with the biggest army. Instead it’s one where disrupting the opposition’s surveillance, analysis, planning and execution can have the greatest impact.
The Ukrainians received a lot of training from our side prior to the current conflict. One example being OP UNIFIER which was the CAF contribution that trained the Ukrainian Forces.
I think a big advantage that the Ukrainians have currently is that the western/NATO battle doctrine encourages (theoretically) initiative and action at all rank levels whilst the Russian doctrine seems to require strict obedience to hierarchy. Something that was trained into us was “if you have no idea what to do next, win the war/act decisively”.
What do you think might be some good steps for Ukraine after the conflict and if they are victorious? I think one of the areas that Ukraine was definitely lacking in at the outset was their Naval forces. I’d suggest that a small professional submarine force would be a good place for them.