• Q*Bert Reynolds@sh.itjust.works
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    1 year ago

    “Engineers have been circulating an old, famous-among-programmers web comic about how all modern digital infrastructure rests on a project maintained by some random guy in Nebraska. (In their telling, Mr. Freund is the random guy from Nebraska.)”

    That’s not quite right. Lasse Collin is the random guy in Nebraska. Freund is the guy that noticed the whole thing was about to topple.

    • BlueÆther@no.lastname.nz
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      1 year ago

      and that one guy (Lasse) was burnt out and pressured [by jia?] to step back and let jia be the person that the whole internet infrastructure relied upon

      • Bitrot@lemmy.sdf.org
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        1 year ago

        Publicly pressured by sock puppets. You can see some rando doing similar in repositories for projects like Avahi.

  • treadful@lemmy.zip
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    1 year ago

    I suspect this was just a lucky catch of shit that happens all the time. Supply chain attacks are super scary and effectively impossible to eliminate in modern software development.

      • treadful@lemmy.zip
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        1 year ago

        It’s almost impossible to spot by people looking directly at the code. I’m honestly surprised this one was discovered at all. People are still trying to deconstruct this exploit to figure out how the RCE worked.

        And supply chain attacks are effectively impossible to eliminate as an attack vector by a developer-user of a N-level dependency. Not having dependencies or auditing every dependency is unreasonable in most cases.

        • Rustmilian@lemmy.world
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          1 year ago

          People are still trying to deconstruct this exploit to figure out how the RCE worked.

          True, but we do know how it got into xz in the first place. Human error and bad practice, we wouldn’t have to reverse engineer the exploit if xz didn’t allow binary commits all together. It’s a very convoluted exploit with hiding “junk” and using awk and other commands to cut around that junk and combining it creating a payload and executing it. Our reliance on binary blobs is a double edged sword.

          supply chain attacks are effectively impossible to eliminate as an attack vector by a developer-user of a N-level dependency. Not having dependencies or auditing every dependency is unreasonable in most cases.

          Also true, because human error is impossible to snuff out completely, however it can be reduced if companies donated to the projects they use. For example, Microsoft depends on XZ and doesn’t donate them anything. It’s free as in freedom not cost. Foss devs aren’t suppliers, it comes as is. If you want improvements in the software your massive company relies on, then donate, otherwise don’t expect anything, they aren’t your slaves.

            • 4z01235@lemmy.world
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              1 year ago

              Generate the binaries during test execution from known (version controlled) inputs, plaintext files and things. Don’t check binaries into source control, especially not intentionally corrupt ones that other maintainers and observers don’t know what they may contain.

        • Possibly linux@lemmy.zip
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          1 year ago

          There are sysadmins that discover a major vulnerabilities though troubleshooting

          The key is the number of people involved

        • fruitycoder@sh.itjust.works
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          1 year ago

          Right now the greatest level of supply chain secuirty that I know of is formal verification, source reproducible builds, and full source bootstrapping build systems. There was a neat FPGA bootstrapping proj3ct (the whole toolchain to program the fpga could be built on the FPGA) at last years FOSDEMs conference, and I have to admit the idea of a physically verifiable root of trust is super exciting to me, but also out of reach for 98% of projects (though more possible by the day).

    • rollingflower@lemmy.kde.social
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      1 year ago

      “Linux saved itself.”

      • having FOSS code
      • being able to silence all system services to detect that bump
      • being able to run stuff in different ways, without a core system component (with and without systemd, as that backdoor only used data when sshd was started via systemd)
      • having people be perfectionist about performance measurements
      • having devs test upstream code not shipped to normal distros
      • being so good microsoft pays people to work on software for it
          • a Kendrick fan@lemmy.ml
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            1 year ago

            Also, the man has said repeatedly on hackernews that he’s a postgresql developer working at microsoft. I imagine that distinction is important.

            • EdgelDil@lemmy.world
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              1 year ago

              And if he was a postgresql dev working on linux but employed by the cheesecake factory it would mean that the cheesecake factory saved linux? or was that rather due to that clever dev, and helped by the platform he worked on?

              • mcc@sh.itjust.works
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                1 year ago

                but if cheesecake factory hired him and supported him to make this discovery, you would look at the menu differently.

              • bruhduh@lemmy.world
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                1 year ago

                No matter how much you wouldn’t like it, there’s fallacy in your statement, either that single individual singlehandedly saved everyone without community and such, or Linux was saved by everyone, Microsoft included, i mean, going to such lengths in mental gymnastics just to exclude some corporation, albeit evil one, is funny i must say, in my opinion it’s either single individual, or everyone included, no need to specifically exclude someone just because they evil or something, and yes, if cheesecake factory hired someone, they shouldn’t be excluded too

  • m4@kbin.social
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    1 year ago

    It felt like it had a bit of sensationalism, which alas is not uncommon in today’s journalism, but can it be too much that a major newspaper like the NYT covering this story can bring indirect attention to the problem of hugely underpaid/no paid people working on (and mantaining) critical FOSS stuff?

    • acockworkorange@mander.xyz
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      1 year ago

      They did claim his work is “boring to tears” right after saying it was “thankless”. What a condescending piece of shit journalist.